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INTRODUCTION 
Transuranic (TRU) solid waste that has been 
generated as a result of the production of nuclear material 
for the United States defense program at the Savannah 
River Site (SRS) has been stored in more than 30,000 55-
gallon drums and carbon steel boxes since 1953. Nearly 
two thirds of those containers have been processed and 
shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.   Among the 
containers assayed so far, the results indicate several 
drums with fissile inventories significantly higher (600 – 
1000 fissile grams equivalent (FGE) 239Pu) than their 
original assigned values. While part of this discrepancy 
can be attributed to the past limited assay capabilities, 
human errors are believed to be the primary contributor. 
 
 This paper summarizes the application of non-
spherical fissile material configuration in waste 
containers, resulting in less restrictive mass and spacing 
limits, increased storage capacity, and several 
administrative controls for handling and storage of waste 
containers being modified without compromising safety. 
 
DISCUSSIONS 
Conservative criticality safety calculations for TRU 
waste containers, assuming fissile material in an optimally 
moderated spherical configuration inside containers, 
resulted in a historical subcritical mass limit of 195 FGE 
239Pu per container for storage of most TRU waste 
containers in an array of containers.  Furthermore, 
criticality safety margins were included in the operating 
procedures at the generator facilities to ensure the 
subcritical mass limit was not violated. 
 
The subcritical mass limit was established based on 
the assumption that other parameters such as moderation, 
fissile material concentration, reflection, geometry, and 
neutron absorber content were at their optimum 
conditions for reactivity for every container in the array. 
Such restrictive subcritical limit would have been 
sufficient for handling and storage of waste containers 
had there been no human errors or underestimated assay 
results involved in generating waste containers exceeding 
195 FGE 239Pu. 
 
A recent statistical analysis of 5,600 waste drums [1] 
determined that the generators consistently, but not 
exclusively, overestimated the fissile content of those 
drums.  While the assay results of waste drums using the 
current assay techniques indicate that the majority of 
drums have much less than 195 FGE 239Pu, in agreement 
with the generators’ original assigned values, a fraction of 
the drums have exceeded the subcritical mass limit by as 
much as 50%.  Additionally, the assay results have 
identified several drums with fissile inventories between 
600 and 1000 FGE 239Pu. 
 
Moderation was assumed to be optimized (as light 
water) in obtaining the subcritical mass limits. Most of the 
moderator in waste is from plastic packaging and bag-out 
sleeves although there is the potential for some water in-
leakage to the packages during storage.  A past study at 
SRS demonstrated that no more than 20 volume percent 
of a container could be hand packed with plastic sheeting 
[2]. Thus, the hydrogen density in a waste matrix is 
considerably less than that of the full density water 
assumed in developing subcritical limits.  For waste 
containers that have not been exposed to rain-water 
during storage, the actual hydrogen density in a waste 
package provides a safety margin. 
 
Neutron absorbers present in the waste also provide 
an additional safety margin. A past study [3] of the 
amounts of polyethylene in a waste container indicates 
that 14.5% of the waste total weight is due to 
polyethylene and 22.3% due to polyvinyl chloride (PVC). 
The chlorine in the PVC is a neutron absorber. 
 
The waste containers have been exposed to various 
configurations and conditions since being packaged.  
These containers have been exposed to various types of 
interaction with other fissile material and reflection from 
other TRU waste containers, forklifts, personnel, etc. 
Some waste drums were buried underground and some 
drums and steel boxes were exposed to rain water during 
storage.  Despite the excess fissile content of some 
containers, the containers have remained subcritical 
because not all the conditions, such as moderation, fissile 
material concentration, reflection, geometry, and neutron 
absorber content, are in the ranges required to support a 
critical configuration. 
 
Compliance with the historical subcritical mass limit 
of 195 FGE 239Pu would require that containers shown to 
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have a fissile mass exceeding 195 FGE 239Pu be isolated 
from other fissile material, which severely hampers 
processing and shipment of waste containers.   
 
New calculations were performed to obtain less 
conservative storage limits. The fissile material 
configuration inside waste drums was assumed to be a 
short cylinder (pancake) at the bottom of the drum with a 
diameter equal to that of the drum internal diameter.  The 
fissile material configuration inside steel boxes was 
assumed to be a slab at the bottom of the steel box with 
lateral dimensions equal to the box internal dimensions. 
The bases for such assumptions are presented below. 
 
A waste packaging practice study [4] concluded that 
fissile material inside the waste containers is randomly 
distributed regardless of the source of the material, the 
waste generator, or when the waste was placed in a 
container.  Given that fissile material in waste is randomly 
distributed upon packaging, it is reasonable to assume that 
the randomly arranged fissile material, in the absence of 
any means inside the containers to agitate the waste and 
accumulate the fissile material in one region, would not 
be able to arrange itself in an optimal geometry 
configuration (i.e., a sphere).  Thus, it is conservative to 
assume that as rain-water enters the container from the 
top it may wash the fissile material to the bottom of the 
container.  As the water level rises at the bottom of the 
container over time, it mixes with fissile material to form 
a cylinder or slab, depending on the container’s geometry. 
 
Rain water could have entered a container only 
through the venting filters or other small penetrations. 
Rain water dripping to the bottom would tend to follow 
the same paths to the bottom of the container, bypassing 
much of the plutonium in the container.  Also, at least a 
portion of the fissile material that is attached to the waste 
is expected to remain attached to the waste even if in the 
drip paths.  Furthermore, much of the fissile material in 
many of the waste containers is contained in plastic bags 
and other containers, which would inhibit settling to the 
bottom of a container. Thus, formation of fissile material 
into an optimally moderated sphere is deemed unrealistic, 
and the most credible, yet conservative, configuration is a 
cylinder or a slab at the bottom of a continuer.   
 
Waste placed into the majority of waste containers 
may have been job control waste or process waste.  Job 
control waste comes from work areas surrounding the 
process lines and consists of items used outside the 
process lines that have become contaminated because of 
trace amounts of fissile material.  Process waste has a 
higher fissile content than job control waste, but it does 
not contain excessive amounts of fissile material because 
of nuclear material accountability, ALARA, and the 
container inventory restrictions imposed on the waste 
generators.  Process waste may include hand tools, lead 
lined gloves, glovebox HEPA filters, plastic bottles 
containing swipes used to clean out cabinets, suits and 
hoses, absorbent, coveralls, brushes, metal cans, scrap 
metal, nuts, bolts, washers, cardboard, plastics, tapes, etc. 
These items are considered contaminated because of 
contact with trace amounts of fissile material. 
 
While the fissile material configuration is assumed to 
collect at the bottom of the containers in a non-spherical 
configuration, the obtained limits are conservative in that 
other parameters such as moderation, fissile material 
concentration, reflection, geometry, and neutron absorber 
content are assumed at their optimum conditions for 
reactivity for every container in the array. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The assumption of a non-spherical fissile material 
configuration inside the waste containers resulted in less 
restrictive mass and spacing limits, increased storage 
capacity, and several administrative controls for handling 
and storage of waste containers being modified without 
compromising safety. 
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